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Notes
A Clarification and Reformulation of Prevailing
Approaches to Product Separability in Franchise
Tie-In Sales
Contractual agreements that require franchise holders' to
buy specified products from the franchisor, or from a source ap-
proved by the franchisor, may constitute illegal tie-in sales
under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 A tie-in sale oc-
curs when a seller conditions the purchase of one product,3 the
1. Franchise systems vary greatly, but most contain the following four el-
ements: (1) the franchise is a legally independent member of the franchising
system, although the franchise may be economically dependent on the
franchisor; (2) the franchise business is operated with the advantage of the
franchisor's name and standardization accruing to the franchisee; (3) the
franchise system is developed for the express purpose of marketing the
franchisor's products or services; and (4) a formal agreement exists that calls
for a continuing, although not necessarily indeterminate, relationship between
the franchisor and the franchisee. D. THOMPSON, FRANcHISE OPERATIONS AND
ANTrrRUST 7-8 (1971).
Through franchising, franchisees are able to obtain the advantages of na-
tional advertising and thus tradename recognition, as well as other economies
of scale enjoyed by large, vertically integrated firms, while retaining their cor-
porate independence. See Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying
Rule: Cutting the Gordian Kno, 66 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1253 (1980). See infra
notes 42-45 and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of the procom-
petitive effects of franchise agreements.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. The Sherman
Antitrust Act was Congress's response to the perceived danger of "slavery that
would result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals and
corporations controlling... the entire business of the country, including the
production and sale of the necessaries of life." Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Tie-in agreements are also per se illegal under § 3 of the Clayton Act. 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1976). In the franchise context, however, because the tying product
is the franchise trademark, see, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), which is an intangible right ap-
purtenant to an existing business or product, see United Drug Co. v. Rectanus
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918), the Clayton Act is inapplicable. The Clayton Act only
applies to situations involving tangible comnodities--"goods, wares, merchan-
dise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). Conse-
quently, private franchise tie-in actions are litigated exclusively under the
Sherman Act.
3. Tie-in sales may involve products, services, or appurtenant rights, such
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tying good, on the purchase of a second product, the tied good.4
The seller is able to condition the sale because the high desira-
bility of the tying good provides the seller sufficient market
power to force the purchase of the less desired tied product.5
Generally, courts have found tie-in sales to be anticompetitive
and thus illegal per se6 when substantial amounts of commerce
are involved.
In the franchise tie-in context, the alleged tying product is
the franchise trademark license.7 Franchise tie-in sales are
unique because of the special relationship between the product
sold through the franchise system and the franchise trademark,
and because of the purported procompetitive effects of
franchises. Trademarks generally function to identify the
source of a particular product or service, but in some cases may
become indicia of the quality of the product, service, or method
of production and thus represent and generate consumer good-
as trademarks, copyrights, or patents. For brevity, this Note will use the word
"product" to refer to any of the sales units that might be implicated in a tie-in.
4. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958);
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRuCTURE AND EcoNoMIc PERFORMANCE 505 (1970).
5. See F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 505; infra note 21. See infra note 35
for limits on a seller's ability to force the purchase of the tied product
6. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); International Salt Co.
v. United'States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). Only agreements that constitute in-
herently unreasonable restraints of trade on their face are per se illegal. See
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (tying arrangement);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (horizontal price
fixing agreement). No actual anticompetitive effect of the challenged agree-
ment need be demonstrated by a plaintiff under the per se standard. See
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. at 397. The per se standard was
first applied to tying agreements in International Salt. In that case, a lease
agreement that required lessees of International machines to use only Interna-
tional's salt products was held illegal per se because "it is unreasonable... to
foreclose competitors from any substantial market." 332 U.S. at 396. The Court
broadened its condemnation of tie-in sales in Northern Pacific when it stated
that tying agreements are "unreasonable in and of themselves." 356 U.S. at 6.
The Court appears to be decreasing its willingness to use the per se ap-
proach, however. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977),
an exclusive territories restriction case, the Supreme Court overruled the per
se rule that had been applied in similar circumstances in United States v.
Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (1967). The Sylvania Court stated that per se illegality is
"appropriate only when [the activities] relate to conduct that is manifestly an-
ticompetitive." 433 U.S. at 49-50. Current economic analysis discounts the ad-
verse economic effects of tie-ins, and thus casts doubt on whether tying
agreements meet the 'manifestly anticompetitive" criterion of Sylvania. See
Baker, supra note 1, at 1267 ("Judged according to the market oriented stan-
dards of Sylvania, the rationale for the per se tying rule is inadequate."); infra
note 35.
7. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
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will.8 In the franchise context, this close relationship between
the trademark and the product with which it is associated com-
plicates antitrust tie-in analysis,9 which requires as a thresh-
hold matter a determination that two separate products exist.'0
Franchise tie-in sales also present special problems because
procompetitive policy considerations militate in favor of certain
types of franchise tie-ins. Tie-ins facilitate the operation of
franchise systems by providing the franchisor a needed mecha-
nism to control product quality." Thus, the anticompetitive ef-
fects of tie-ins must be weighed against the interests of
franchisors who wish to protect the quality associated with
their trademarks.
Franchise tie-in analysis has centered on whether the
franchise trademark can be considered a product separate from
the products sold under the trademark.12 In Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 13 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that a franchise trademark can constitute a separate
product, and developed an approach to determine product sep-
arability based on a trademark's function. This approach dis-
tinguishes trademarks that identify product source from those
that identify product quality.' 4 Although subsequent decisions
have generally followed the Chicken Delight approach,' 5 two re-
8. See Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in Franchis-
ing Arrangements, 116 U. PA. L REv. 435, 436-39 (1968).
9. Cf. Treece, supra note 8, at 435-36 ('The suggestion is sometimes made
that the legal limits of franchisee control should be determined, not merely by
antitrust policy, but by trademark policy as well. This suggestion implies the
existence of a general principle which would restrain action otherwise dictated
by antitrust considerations in deference to trademark policy.").
10. See infra note 12.
11. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
12. The product separability element is crucial in the tie-in context be-
cause "the very essence of a franchise is the purchase of several related prod-
ucts in a single competitively attractive package." Phillips v. Crown Cent.
Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 628 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1979). If
the franchise trademark only designates that the franchisor manufactured the
product sold by the franchisee, then that franchise trademark cannot be found
to be something separate from the tied product. See infra notes 81-94 and ac-
companying text; Note, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust Law: The Two
Product Rule for Tying Arrangements, 27 SYRACUSE L REV. 953, 954 (1976).
13. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
14. Product source trademarks signify that the franchisor manufactured
the product sold by the franchisee; product quality trademarks represent that
the product will be of a certain quality and that it was produced in accordance
with the franchisor's standards. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,
549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977); Warriner Hermetics v. Copeland, 463 F.2d 1002 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.,
419 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage
Co., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Mich. 1975). Cf. Principe v. McDonald's Corp.,
11671983]
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cent Ninth Circuit cases, Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream
Co. 16 and Hamro v. Shell Oil Co., 17 restricted its application
and contained language and analysis that make difficult any
straightforward enunciation of the current version of the rule.
These cases illustrate the difficulty of determining product sep-
arability under Chicken Delight and underscore the need for
elaboration of the product separability test.
This Note attempts to clarify and reformulate prevailing
approaches for determining product separability. Part I de-
scribes judicial rationales for the per se illegality of tie-ins and
considers the unique and arguably procompetitive effect of tie-
ins in the franchise context. Part II examines prior case law
dealing with franchise tying arrangements, initially focusing on
general tie-in illegality requirements and then recounting pre-
vious and alternative approaches to the Ninth Circuit's
franchise product separability test. The Part then discusses,
evaluates, and interprets the approach articulated in Chicken
Delight, Krehl, and Hamro. Finally, the Note suggests a refor-
mulation of this approach, presenting an analytic framework
that reconciles the Ninth Circuit's cases and facilitates a more
logical and unified treatment of product separability in the
franchise tie-in context.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR
FRANCHISE TIE-IN ILLEGALITY
A. JuDiciAL RAnONALES FOR PER SE ILLEGALITY
The federal courts' per se standard of illegality for tie-in
cases stems from their perception of tie-ins as monopolistic
pricing devices lacking any legitimate business purpose. 18 The
courts believe that tie-ins foreclose competition by extending
monopoly power from one market to a second market (the so-
called leverage theory), 19 and by creating barriers to entry for
631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding nonseparate products), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
970 (1981); see also infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
16. 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
17. 674 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982).
18. ".Tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppres-
sion of competition.... The existence of market control for the tying device,
therefore, affords a strong foundation for the presumption that it has been or
probably will be used to limit competition in the tied product also." Standard
Oi4 337 U.S. at 305-06. In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958), the Court characterized tie-ins as having a "pernicious effect on
competition."
19. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. at 306; Susser v. Carrel
Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1964). The leverage theory "works on the as-
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potential competitors in the tied good market.20
The alleged extension of market power from the tying
product market to the tied product market produces several
perceived effects. 21 First, a tie-in forecloses the seller's compet-
itors in the tied product market from buyers in that market.22
Since the seller's market power in the tying product market al-
lows it to require buyers who desire that product to buy the
tied product from the same monopoly seller, other sellers are
prevented from dealing with these buyers in the tied product
market.23  Courts condemn this foreclosure because
"[c]ompetitors are denied free access to the tied market prod-
uct, not because the party imposing the arrangement has a su-
perior product, but rather because of the power of leverage
exerted by the tying product."24 This foreclosure thus runs
sumption that the purpose of tying arrangements is monopolistic exploitation,
achieved by 'artificially extending the market of the 'tied' product beyond the
consumer acceptance it might rate if competing independently on its merit on
equal terms."' Comment, Franchise Tie-Ins and Antitrust: A Critical Analysis,
1973 Wis. L. REv. 847, 856. See D. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 77.
20. See Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REV. 283, 287 (1980).
21. Courts see the use of the tying product's market power in the tied mar-
ket as enabling the creation of new market power in the tied product market.
See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 512
(1967); Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1982); Moore v. Jas. H.
Mathews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 1977); Lockhart & Sacks, The Rele-
vance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements
Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act 65 HARV. L. REv. 913, 944 (1952). See also
D. THOMPsoN, supra note 1, at 77 (leverage theory generally).
All forced tie-in sales necessarily require some degree of market power by
the seller over the tying product. Without this market power, the buyer would
feel no compulsion to acquiesce to the tie-in terms. See Bowman, Tying Ar-
rangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 31 (1957) ("A tie-in is a
useless device unless the supplier possesses substantial monopoly power over
the tying product."); McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The
Trouble with Tie-Ins, 58 CAMiF. L. REV. 1085, 1107 (1970) ("Sufficient economic
power can be inferred from the fact that many franchisees accept [the tie-
in]."). See also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
22. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Times-Pica-
yune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
23. Some commentators have argued that significant seller foreclosure
from the tied product market requires a lack of alternative uses for the tied
good and a great amount of market power in the tying good. These conditions
are rare and should not exist in the franchise context. See Burstein, A Theory
of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62, 76 (1960). The portion of the tied
product market foreclosed to other sellers would only constitute those tied
goods purchased in conjunction with the tying good. The rest of the market
would not be under the influence of the tying seller's market power in the tying
product market. Id.
24. Betaseed, Inc., v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1215 (9th Cir. 1982). See also
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) ('They deny compet-
itors free access to the market for the tied product, not because the party im-
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contrary to basic principles of a competitive market philosophy.
Because forces outside the parameters of supply and demand
are involved,25 competition is frustrated "on grounds unrelated
to the inherent qualities of the tied product."26
Coercion of the buyer constitutes a second aspect of the
leverage theory.27 Tie-ins force buyers to purchase tied goods
from sellers other than those from whom the buyer might
purchase in a competitive market.2 8 Courts consider the limita-
tion on buyers' freedom to purchase from whomever they wish
to be contrary to the competitive model.29 Integral to federal
antitrust policies is a desire to enhance individual economic
freedom3O by providing "freedom of action and the wide range
of choices that freedom implies."3 1 Because this desired indi-
posing the tying requirement has a better product or a lower price but because
of his power or leverage in another market.").
25. See J. HIRSCHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 198 (1976) ("A
competitive trader... regards himself as able to buy or sell any desired quan-
tity at the current ruling price."). Price is set in a competitive market at the
level at which the amount of the good supplied at a given price equals the
amount of the good that will be bought at that price. Individual sellers cannot
manipulate the market price but rather view it as fixed. Id. at 198-201. "[A]n
industry is said to be competitive (or more precisely, purely competitive) only
when the number of firms selling a homogeneous commodity is so large, and
each individual firm's share of the market is so small, that no individual firm
finds itself able to influence the commodity's price significantly by varying the
quantity of output it sells." F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 9. An important com-
ponent of an "ideal" competitive market is the absence of barriers to entry of
new firms. Id. at 10. Seller foreclosure, which constitutes a barrier to entry to
the tied buyer's individual market, thus violates the competitive model.
26. Bauer, supra note 20, at 287.
27. See Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 344 U.S. 495, 503, 512
(1967) (White, J., dissenting); Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1220
(9th Cir. 1982); Moore v. Jas. H. Mathews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir.
1977).
28. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); Susser v.
Carrel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1964); Comment, Antitrust-Franchis-
ing-Principe v. McDonald's Corp.-Big Mac Attacks the Chicken Delight Rule,
7 J. CORP. L. 137, 138 (1981); Comment, supra note 19, at 857. Cf. Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 53 (1977) (foreclosure of options to buyer
is not sufficient for a Sherman Act violation in exclusive franchise context).
29. Through tie-ins, "a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent
judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits ...." Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953). In a competitive market, buyers
are free to choose from whom they wish to buy. Competitive markets are pre-
maised upon optimization of a buyer's individual preferences. If a buyer's
choice is coerced, preferences are not optimized. See J. HmSCHLEIFER, supra
note 25, at 140 ("Economics concentrates upon ... the integration of individu-
als' separate goal seeking activities through the market."); Slawson, A Stronger,
Simpler Tie-In Doctrine, 25 ANTrrRuST Bui. 671, 676 (1980).
30. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Pitof-
sky, The Political Context of Antitrust 127 U. PA. L REv. 1051, 1056-57 (1979).
31. Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust. A Dialogue on Policy, 65 CoLum.
L. REV. 377, 383 (1965).
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vidual freedom is curtailed when a tie-in restricts buyers'
choices, 32 this "is in itself a lessening of competition."33
A third criticism of tie-ins under the leverage theory is that
they create a monopoly in the tied product market.34 Courts
argue that the foreclosure of buyers to other sellers caused by
the tie-in decreases the number of competitors, increases mar-
ket concentration, and thus tends to create a monopoly.35
32. Id. at 384.
33. Slawson, supra note 29, at 676.
34. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 513
(1967) (White, J., dissenting) ("The tying seller may be working toward a mo-
nopoly position in the tied product."); D. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 77
(Court's concept of leverage encompasses idea of the establishment of a sec-
ond monopoly). Cf. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Law, 41
U. Cm. L. REV. 506, 508 (1974) ("People used to regard tying as a method by
which a firm having a monopoly in one market ... could obtain a monopoly of
a second product .... ).
Neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act makes illegal the existence
of monopoly power, but only agreements in restraint of trade or attempts to
monopolize (Sherman Act) or acts which may substantially lessen competition
(Clayton Act). The antitrust laws focus on the misuse of monopoly power, and
thus tie-ins are condemned for the use of market power in a different market.
35. See Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1221 (9th Cir. 1982). See
also Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 21, at 944 (alternative suppliers of tied prod-
uct deprived of business of dealers depending on the tying product).
Economic analysts disagree with the courts' assumption that tie-ins are
motivated by a seller's desire to extend monopoly power from the tying good
market to the tied good market. Bauer, supra note 20, at 291. 'The economists
of the 'Chicago School'. . . have mounted a powerful attack on the implicit eco-
nomic theory that underlies current policy of the law towards the allegedly ex-
clusionary practices." Posner, supra note 34, at 506. Applying economic theory,
economists assert that tie-ins cannot enhance a seller's monopoly power be-
cause the seller can extract monopoly profits in the tied market only to the
same extent as his monopoly power in the tying market. See, e.g., Burstein,
supra note 23. See generally Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage
Theory, 76 YALE LJ. 1397, 1398 (1968). The buyer will regard the tying and tied
products as a package. A seller uses its market power in the tying product
market (its ability to sell above the competitive price) to compel purchase of
the tied good. The seller initially has no market power in the tied market, how-
ever, so the buyer will only be willing to pay a price for the combined package
of goods (the tying and tied products) equal to the monopoly price of the tying
product and the competitive price of the tied product. If the price of the tied
product is above the competitive level, the buyer will treat that difference as an
increase in the price of the tying product and, thus, demand for the tying prod-
uct will decline. See Moore v. Jas. H. Mathews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1977); Posner, supra note 34, at 508. The seller cannot increase monopoly
profits by tying the two goods together, because monopoly rents in the tying
product market present an upper limit to profits from the combined good pack-
age. Therefore, economists conclude that tie-in sales are not motivated by a de-
sire to extend monopolies.
Economists argue that a more likely motivation for tie-in sales is that they
facilitate price discrimination. Price discrimination is the activity of a seller
with monopoly power attempting to increase its profits by extracting consumer
surplus. Consumer surplus is the amount that a buyer would pay for a product
in excess of the price charged, aggregated across all consumers. When buyer A
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The second major rationale for holding tie-ins illegal per se
is that would-be competitors are prevented from competing in
the tied good market because the tie-in erects a separate bar-
rier to entry.36 Potential entrants to the tied product market
must also produce the tying product to attract the buyers
purchasing the tied products.37 Entry into both markets re-
quires extra capital and expertise,38 and the tying product mar-
ket poses barriers to entry that must be surmounted.39 Courts
characterize the consequences of this barrier to entry as "dras-
tic."40 Because the tie-in prevents competitors from entering
the market, courts find tie-ins inherently anticompetitive.4 1
is willing to pay $20 for a widget, and the monopoly price is $17 per widget, the
buyer gains $3 in consumer surplus. A price discriminator will set different
prices to sell to different buyers so price is closer to their actual valuation of
the product. Thus, seller profits increase and consumer surplus decreases. See
J. HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note 25, at 290-96; Posner, supra note 34, at 509. A mo-
nopolist can assume that a buyer who values a product highly will use that
product more intensively than a buyer with a lower valuation. A tied good thus
can serve as a monitor of intensity of use. See Burstein, supra note 23, at 64-65.
The classic case is International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298
U.S. 131 (1936).
Commentators have disputed the economic effects of such tie-in price dis-
crimination, and thus it is unclear whether the use of tie-ins to price discrimi-
nate poses an argument for or against their illegality. See R. Born, THE
ANrmuST PARADox 381 (1978); Bauer, supra note 20, at 297; Bowman, supra
note 21, at 93; Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust, 125 U. PA. L REV. 1191, 1205
(1977); Posner, supra note 34, at 510-13.
36. See Hirsch v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir.
1982). A barrier to entry is any impediment a potential seller must overcome to
enter the market. Barriers can range from technological (present seller has a
technical advantage) to capital outlay requirements (large fixed, initial cost).
Barriers to entry are essential for monopolists, because other businesses have
an incentive to enter the monopolistic market if entry is free. See F. ScHERER,
supra note 4, at 10 ("[S]ignificant entry barriers are the sine qua non of mo-
nopoly and oligopoly.... [S] ellers have little or no enduring power over price
when entry barriers are non-existent.").
37. See Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1220 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Po-
tential competitors may be required to enter simultaneously two separate prod-
uct markets."); Bauer, supra note 20, at 288. These buyers desire both
products. If they can obtain the tying product only from the seller requiring
the tie-in, they are forced to acquiesce. They will buy the tied product from
competitors only when they can also obtain the tying product from a source
other than the tie-in seller.
38. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 494, 513
(1967).
39. The market power of the tie-in seller must be supported by some type
of barrier. See supra note 36.
40. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
605 (1953); Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1220 (9th Cir. 1982).
41. The effect of the barrier to entry, however, will not be large in indus-
tries in which the tied product has substantial uses other than merely as a
complement to the tying product, because the percentage of the tied product
market unavailable to new entrants will be small. The amount of foreclosure in
most franchise situations would be small, because products marketed under a
1172 [Vol. 67:1165
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B. PROCOMPETrIVE EFFECTS OF FRANCHISE TIE-IN SALES
In general, franchise systems promote competition by ex-
panding the number of sales outlets and by creating efficiencies
of production and distribution.42 The intrinsic goodwill value of
the franchise trademark allows franchisees to enter the market
with little capital and a strong chance for success. 43 Without
these advantages of franchising, fewer people would be able to
operate businesses. Increasing the number of entrants into the
market expands the distributive base, resulting in greater com-
petition at the horizontal level44 and retarding tendencies to-
specific franchise trademark are almost always marketed in other instances.
For example, the market for hamburger buns, or ketchup, is not dependent on
McDonald's-McDonald's occupies a very small percentage of the overall mar-
ket. Therefore, foreclosure of sales to one franchise chain would not noticeably
diminish the amount of business accessible to new entrants.
42. "Service establishments, traditionally burdened with high fixed costs,
and too often lacking in managerial know-how, are responding to new tech-
niques under the franchising system. Use of automated equipment, of tested
standardized operating systems, and of carefully planned training methods-all
help trim labor costs, enhance efficiency, and provide a more responsive cus-
tomer service." 9 J. VON KALINowsKI, ANTrrRusT LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
III-A-45 app. (1981) (deleted 1982). See F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 97.
43. It has been estimated that a franchise system has an eight times better
probability of success than an independent small business. D. THOMPSON,
supra note 1, at 33. "There are indications that members of franchise systems
have substantially lower failure rates than do comparable independent busi-
nessmen. Printers Ink has claimed an overall small business failure rate of 60
percent, compared to only 10 percent for franchisees. Various studies show
franchisee failure rates ranging from one percent to twenty-eight percent (of
new franchises) per year." Id. "To the franchisee, franchising is probably the
only business form which provides an individual with little capital or experi-
ence the opportunity to operate his own business with a reasonable chance of
success." Comment, supra note 19, at 848. See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of
America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1222 (3d Cir. 1976); Note, supra note 12, at 958.
These figures suggest that a prospective retailer might prefer to enter the
market as a franchisee rather than as owner of an independent business, thus
causing a decrease in the total number of independent businesses in the mar-
ket. This result could be viewed as anticompetitive, if viewed in isolation, but
the tendency to discourage independent entry must be balanced against the
huge increase in available entry caused by the franchise mode of business. On
balance, many more individual entrepreneurs gain entry because of franchises
than would without them.
44. The expansion of franchised businesses since 1950 has been called
"phenomenal." D. THoMPsON, supra note 1, at 26. Because independent busi-
nessmen are able to obtain capital through the franchise system that they
would not be able to obtain on their own, more businesses may enter the mar-
ket to compete. Id. at 35. Increased entry decreases any one firm's percentage
of the market, and thus its ability to control price by varying quantity. See F.
SCHERER, supra note 4, at 9.
"Perhaps the most important long-run contribution of the franchise form
will be its role in broadening the distributive base of the economy through its
encouragement of small business." D. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 37. The bene-
ficial economic effects of broadening the distributive base were explained in
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ward vertical integration.45
Because franchise systems are generally procompetitive,
tie-in arrangements that facilitate these systems may be desira-
ble. In situations in which the franchisor does not distribute a
finished product, trademark license/product tie-ins allow the
franchisor to control the quality of the product associated with
the trademark by supplying its component parts, thus ensuring
the trademark's goodwill value.46 Quality control is essential to
the franchisor's success, because the goodwill value of the
trademark represents the reasonable expectation that the prod-
uct will be purchased again.47 If these expectations are not ful-
filled, consumers will likely frequent a different sales outlet.
Franchisors, therefore, are especially concerned with quality
control.
Individual franchisees, on the other hand, have an incen-
tive to lower quality, which decreases the franchisee's costs
and increases the franchisee's profit margin.48 The individual
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d
Cir. 1964):
The franchise method of operation has the advantage, from the stand-
point of our American system of competitive economy, of enabling nu-
merous groups of individuals with small capital to become
entrepreneurs.... If our economy had not developed [franchising]
these individuals would have turned out to have been merely employ-
ees. The franchise system creates a class of independent businessmen;
it provides the public with an opportunity to get a uniform product at
numerous points of sale from small independent contractors, rather
than employees of a vast chain. The franchise system of operation is
therefore good for the economy.
Id. at 640.
45. Vertical integration results when a franchisor decides to own and oper-
ate its retail outlets itself. See Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified
Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 379 (5th Cir. 1977); Burstein, supra note 23, at 84.
"[F]ranchise arrangements may sometimes create better competitive markets
than would otherwise exist .... [With vertical integration] competition at the
local level would be as nonexistent under a system of national ownership of lo-
cal stores as it would be under a franchise system utilizing explicit ties." Ken-
tucky Fried Chicken; 549 F.2d at 379. See F. SCHERER, supra note 4, at 70
(discussing the anticompetitive effects of vertical integration).
46. Note, supra note 12, at 958. Tie-ins in some instances operate as quali-
ty controls which protect the value of the franchise trademark. The quality as-
sociated with the trademark determines its value. Id.
47. See Susser v. Carrel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1964); Treece,
supra note 8, at 437; Note, supra note 12, at 957.
48. Baker, supra note 1, at 1278. Two different situations give individual
franchisees an incentive to change quality. First, if they serve a large number
of nonrepeat customers, individual franchisees do not expect these customers
to buy from them again, and therefore, they are not as concerned with satisfy-
ing these customers. Second, if an individual franchisee services customers
whose tastes vary from the general population, the individual franchisee will
sell a product conforming to its customers' tastes and not the tastes of the gen-
eral population (the customers of the franchisor). Id.
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franchisee bears only a percentage of the cost of any consumer
dissatisfaction,49 while the franchisor bears the full cost. The
interests of franchisors in maintaining the quality of the prod-
ucts associated with the trademarks, therefore, are significantly
greater than those of individual franchisees. If franchisors are
not allowed to use tie-ins to ensure product quality, and an-
other, equally cost effective means of quality control is unavail-
able,5 0 the franchise mode of operation will become
substantially less attractive.
II. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING
PRODUCT SEPARABILITY
IN FRANCHISE TIE-INS
Courts require the existence of three elements before they
will hold a tying arrangement to be illegal per se. First, the sale
must involve two separate products, with the sale of one, the
tying product, conditioned on the buyer's purchase of the sec-
ond, the tied product.5l Second, sufficient market power (or
monopoly power) must exist to compel the buyer to accept the
tie-in. 52 Finally, the tie-in must affect a "not insubstantial"
amount of interstate commerce.53 Even when these three ele-
ments are present, however, a defendant may avoid application
of the per se standard by raising the defense that a legitimate
business purpose justifies the use of the tie-in arrangement.5 4
49. This is the "free rider" principle. Any customer dissatisfied with an in-
dividual franchise will associate his or her dissatisfaction with all of the
franchises. The low quality individual franchisee, however, can still rely on the
quality of all other franchises to maintain the public's perception of its quality.
The effect of one individual franchisee's efforts to increase or decrease quality,
therefore, is nominal and the individual franchisee will save more money by re-
ducing quality than it will lose in consumer dissatisfaction. See Baker, supra
note 1, at 1257-58.
50. Often quality can be controlled through specifications and other meas-
ures short of tie-in agreements, and in these cases the elimination of the tie-in
would not inhibit the operation of the franchise system. Situations do exist,
however, in which specifications either would be unworkable or would impose
exorbitant enforcement costs on the franchisor. See, e.g., Krehl v. Baskin-Rob-
bins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir. 1982); Susser v. Carvel Corp.,
332 F.2d 505, 520 (2d Cir. 1964).
51. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507
(1969); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
52. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). The re-
quirement of sufficient market power to compel the tie-in is a heavily litigated
issue in franchise tie-in cases. See, e.g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519
(2d Cir. 1964) (franchise of ice cream stores lacked market power).
53. Carve4 332 F.2d at 519.
54. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397 (1947).
This addition to the per se formula is termed the "modified per se test." See
Comment, supra note 28, at 139.
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The use of franchise tie-ins to ensure product quality and gen-
erate goodwill, to protect experimental products and industries,
and to prevent wholesale consumer dissatisfaction constitute
the three accepted business justifications for tie-ins.55 This de-
fense succeeds, however, only when the court determines that
the method used by the seller was the alternative least restric-
tive to competition.5 6 Courts generally have accepted business
justification defenses only in limited circumstances.57
A major problem in tie-in litigation is that the courts have
frequently confused and mixed together the quality control
business justification defense with the initial requirement that
there be separate products. 58 In United States v. Jerrold Elec-
tronics Corp., 59 a nonfranchise case, the court concluded that a
business justification defense60 effectively reduced two prod-
55. See Note, Product Separability in Franchise Tying Arrangements: The
Fourth Circuit's New Rule, 38 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1195, 1201 (1981).
56. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d
368 (5th Cir. 1977). Kentucky Fried Chicken required its franchisees to buy
carry-out chicken boxes, napkins, plastic utensils, and other supplies from it or
from sources approved by it in writing. Id. at 373. The court stated that al-
though product protection through tying can be legally legitimate, "the
franchisor must establish that the tie constitutes the method of maintaining
quality that imposes the least burden on commerce. If there are less burden-
some alternatives, a franchisor is obligated to employ them rather than the tie."
Id. at 376.
57. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) (tying
justification as mechanism to protect goodwill rejected because specification al-
most always an adequate safeguard); International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947) (quality control defense rejected because salt judged
capable of specification); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51-52 (9th
Cir. 1971) (quality control justification rejected because tied products capable
of specification), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332
F.2d 505, 520 (2d Cir. 1964) (quality control justification accepted because speci-
fication of ice cream quality found impossible); United States v. Jerrold Elec-
tronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (tie-in of service allowed
while product in "experimental stage" because of importance of service to suc-
cess of the product).
58. See generally Ross, The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A
Functional Approach, 23 EMoRY L.J. 963 (1974); Note, supra note 55 (treating
Jerrold as employing a two-step test for product separability).
59. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
60. Defendant Jerrold sold "state of the art" community television antenna
equipment and tied its sale to mandatory service contracts. Id. at 552. Jerrold
argued that the experimental nature of the business justified its exclusive right
to service the product to ensure its proper functioning. The district court up-
held the defense, reasoning that proper servicing of the antenna system was es-
sential to the system's success, and that the performance of the initial antenna
system would determine the ultimate success of Jerrold's business. Id. at 557.
Tying experimental products to ensure favorable consumer results meets the
business justification criteria when three requisites are met: 1) the success of
the business must be dependent on the success of the first few systems; 2) the
system must be technologically sophisticated; and 3) the justification exists
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ucts into a single product, thereby removing the necessary first
element of per se illegality from the analysis.6 1 Thus, the court
applied a business justification defense to the issue of product
separability.62
Although the elements of per se illegality apply to all tie-in
cases, franchise tie-in agreements present problems not found
in standard tie-in litigation.63 As a threshold matter, analysis of
alleged franchise tie-ins must focus on whether the trademark
and the alleged tied product actually constitute two distinct
products and, if so, whether a business justification exists for
the tying arrangement.64 The product separability test in
franchise tie-ins requires a determination that the franchise
trademark has an identity distinct from the products sold
under that trademark.65 If the court finds two distinct products,
the court will examine the tie-in arrangement for a business
justification. Franchisors most commonly argue that the tie-ins
are justified to protect product goodwill,66 as other business
only for the limited amount of time that the product remains in the experimen-
tal stage. Id. at 557-58.
61. Id. at 560 ("[T]he court concludes that Jerrold's policy of full system
sales was a necessary adjunct to its policy of compulsory service and was rea-
sonably regarded as a [single] product as long as the conditions which dictated
the use of the service contract continued to exist.").
62. Nevertheless, Jerrold has been subsequently interpreted as applying a
two-step test to the issue of product separability. The two-step test has been
stated as follows. First, the court determines whether the tying and tied prod-
ucts are normally separate, and second, it decides whether a legitimate busi-
ness reason exists for considering the two products as a single product. See
Note, supra note 55, at 1199. This interpretation of the Jerrold language is sup-
ported by a footnote in Jerrold, which approvingly referred to "Jerrold's argu-
ment that it was selling a legitimate single product." Jerrold, 187 F. Supp. at
560 n.28.
63. It can be argued that the different factual context of franchises renders
ordinary tie-in law completely inapplicable. One commentator has suggested
that "[t]his difference may make the tying doctrine inapplicable in franchising
because both the effects of and reasons for imposition of tie-ins may be differ-
ent." Comment, supra note 19, at 858. See also Note, supra note 55, at 1201
(discussing Jerrold).
64. See Note, supra note 55, at 1201.
65. See infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
66. Courts normally will not accept this quality control defense if the use
of specifications can ensure adequate quality control, since the defense re-
quires the tie-in sale to be the least restrictive alternative. See Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v.
Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 1977); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward
Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1976); McCarthy, supra note 21, at 1111.
The defendant must prove that specifications are too detailed and complex to
be practical See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 515 (2d Cir. 1964). These
general rules might not apply so strictly to franchise tie-ins, however, because
of the specific quality control problems inherent in the franchise system. See
supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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justifications are rarely pertinent to the franchise context.67 As
in other tie-in contexts, however, the product separability and
business justification doctrines have occasionally been mixed,
causing confusion 68 as to whether the franchisor's ability to
control quality through specifications relates to the product
separability question. 69
A. CAR VEL, PRINCIPE, AND CHICKEN DELIGHT
The first major franchise tie-in case that expressly ex-
amined product separability was Susser v. Carvel Corp., 70 in
which the franchisor required its franchisees to buy ice cream
mix and other products used in the preparation and sale of ice
cream from the franchisor.71 Focusing on Carvel's sales of com-
ponent supplies as distinct items, the court found that the
franchise trademark and the product ingredients constituted
67. The experimental product defense is uncommon in franchise cases be-
cause most franchises are well developed by the time litigation arises (since
the requisite of market power must be met for per se illegality), and thus the
franchise business is no longer "experimental." Prevention of consumer dissat-
isfaction justifies tie-in sales when the proper functioning of the product re-
quires its use in combination with a second (tied) product. Dehydrating
Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656-57 (Ist Cir. 1961); Note, supra
note 55, at 1201.
68. See Ross, supra note 58, at 989-93 ('"The confusion engendered by this
mixing of justifications has been the single greatest detriment to an under-
standing of the separability issue's proper place in the 'tying allegation.");
Stewart, Antitrust Considerations Involved in Product Distribution, 19 Bus.
LAw. 967, 995 (1964) (courts "inextricability [mix] discussion of reasonable
business justification with talk of a single product being involved"). Two major
problems result from this confusion. First, the burden of proof and the stan-
dards used to find 'Justification" are changed. Ross, supra note 58, at 992. The
defendant has the burden to show that the tie-in is the alternative least restric-
tive to competition when business justification is used as an affirmative de-
fense. A danger exists that these standards occasionally change when the
business justification defense is included in the product separability analysis.
See Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980) (when court used
analysis under product separability that belonged under business justification,
the alternative least restrictive to competition was not used); Ross, supra note
58, at 992 n.146. The second, and major, result of the Jerrold confusion is the
resulting inconsistency in case law analysis of franchise tie-ins. The possible
harm of these inconsistencies is magnified by the general uncertainty concern-
ing product separability in franchise tie-in litigation. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 97-128.
69. See infra notes 110-11, 123-24 and accompanying text.
70. 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964). This issue was also considered in FTC v.
Carvel, 68 F.T.C. 128 (1965). The Commission, under the same facts as Susser,
ruled that "Carvel's franchise agreements cannot be regarded as tie-in arrange-
ments because the trademark's license conceptually cannot constitute a 'tying'
product and, even if it could, it could never be regarded as a separate 'product'
apart from the mix and commissary items to which it is attached within the
meaning of the typical tie-in arrangements." Id. at 174.
71. 332 F.2d at 509.
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separate products.7 2 Carvel's lasting significance lies not in the
distinct products approach7 3 used to determine product separa-
bility, but rather in that it was the first case to find a franchise
trademark to be a separate product from the products sold
under the trademark.
Two major approaches to franchise product separability
have developed since Carvel. One approach is that enunciated
in the Ninth Circuit's Chicken Delight line of cases,7 4 and the
other is that applied in the Fourth Circuit's recent Principe v.
McDonald's Corp. decision.75 The Fourth Circuit's radical de-
parture from the Ninth Circuit's approach to product separabil-
ity in the franchise context is illuminating. In Principe,
McDonald's required its hamburger franchisees to lease their
buildings from a McDonald's subsidiary.76 The court took a
deferential approach to the franchisor's concerns, and held that
normally separate items could constitute a single product if
they were essential ingredients of a franchise system's formula
for success. 77 Restated, the issue was "whether the tied prod-
72. Id. at 514. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9th Cir.
1971) ("all three judges [in Carvel I regarded as a tying product the trade-mark
license to ice cream outlet franchisees"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). The
tie-in agreement was held valid because the court split on whether these tie-ins
were justified to control quality. The majority found that specification of quali-
ty standards for something as "insusceptible of precise verbilization" as ice
cream quality was unreasonably burdensome. 332 F.2d at 520. This quality
analysis is still quoted to support business justification defenses. The Carvel
majority did not require Carvel's quality control measure to be the least restric-
tive alternative. In contrast, the dissent concluded that Carvel did not demon-
strate that quality specifications would be inadequate to protect quality. It
noted that Carvel did not manufacture the ingredients itself, so that if the
franchisor could specify to its suppliers the required formulas, the same could
be done for franchisees' suppliers. Id. at 515. The court was split on the busi-
ness justification defense, but Judge Lumbard, who dissented on the business
justification issue, wrote for the court on the other issues. Id. at 508.
73. 332 F.2d at 514. Distinct products is the test used in conventional tie-in
arrangements. The inquiry is whether the tying and tied products are "physi-
cally distinct and capable of being sold separately."
74. See Hamro v. Shell Oil, 674 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982); Krehl v. Baskin-
Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982); Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
75. 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980).
76. Id. at 304.
77. This test views normally separate items as one product if these items
are an essential component of the franchise. Id- at 309 ("where the challenged
aggregation is an essential ingredient of the franchised system's formula for
success, there is but a single product and no tie in exists as a matter of law").
See also Zeidman, Legal Problems in the Life Cycle of a Franchise, 50 ANr-
TRUST LJ. 855, 861 (1982) (Principe held that product separability is not neces-
sarily satisfied in a business format franchise); Note, supra note 55, at 1207.
Critics of Principe argue that this broad and vague formulation demonstrates
the current confusion in determining product separability. See Comment,
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ucts are integral components of the business method being
franchised."8 Although the court described four unique as-
pects of the tied real estate leases that caused it to believe that
the tied product constituted an integral component of the
franchise's success,7 9 it failed to enunciate a test for deciding
when a product is or is not an "integral component." The court
apparently included a business justification analysis in its de-
termination of product separability by implicitly deciding that
McDonald's had a legitimate concern that its franchises use a
specific type of building.80
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Siegel v.
Chicken Delight8l developed the "essential function" test to de-
termine when a franchise trademark is separate from the prod-
ucts marketed under that trademark, overriding the distinct
products approach to separability of Carvel that had previously
prevailed. In Chicken Delight, the franchisor licensed its trade-
mark to retail take-out chicken outlets. Instead of charging a
Principe v. McDonald's Corp.; The Separability Issue in Franchise Tying Ar-
rangements, 12 Loy. U. C-H. L.J. 839, 849 (1981).
78. 631 F.2d at 310. The court focused on the amount of planning and direc-
tion McDonald's gives its franchisees. The "franchisee pays ... for the right to
become a part of a system whose business methods virtually guarantee his suc-
cess." Id. at 309. The court held that the building lease was thus not separable
from the rest of the franchise because the building contributes significantly to
McDonald's success. Id. at 311.
79. First, McDonald's was able to obtain better sites than could franchisees
because of McDonald's superior "economic might" and its elaborate market re-
search. Second, the tie-in assured that the store buildings would remain Mc-
Donald's stores. McDonald's Corporation's goodwill would be damaged if
buildings identifiable as former McDonald's were subsequently used for other
purposes. Third, by providing the building, McDonald's did not need to con-
sider a potential franchisee's ability to obtain real estate when making selec-
tions, but could evaluate the applicants solely on their "management
potential." Finally, the tie-in furthered the partnership relationship between
McDonald's and its franchisees. Id. at 310. See also Comment, supra note 77,
at 853-54.
80. Principe reflects a recent trend toward finding seemingly distinct prod-
ucts to be inseparable. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Hirsh v. Martindale-
Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982), presents the most recent exten-
sion of this trend. Martindale-Hubbell required attorneys wishing to purchase
advertisements to buy the directory itself, and required those purchasing pro-
fessional cards to buy informative cards. Id. at 1346. The court held that no tie-
ins existed because the products were inseparable. Id. at 1348. The court rea-
soned that the advertisements were only effective if the directory's circulation
was large, that the directory sale requirement increased circulation, and, there-
fore, that where "the aggregate sale of ostensibly separate items serves to im-
prove the quality of the product offered by the seller.., no tying agreement is
present." Id. at 1348. This analysis, that products are inseparable if the end
product's quality is improved by the tie-in, is very similar to the integral com-
ponents test of Principe, which examines the impact of the "tied product" on
the overall success of the franchise.
81. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
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franchise fee, the franchisor required its franchisees to
purchase mixes, ingredients, and packaging and cooking equip-
ment from Chicken Delight.8 2 The Ninth Circuit held that
these products were separable, comprising an illegal tie-in.
8 3
The Chicken Delight court focused on the function of the
trademark in analyzing the product separability question.8 4
The court identified two functions of franchise trademarks:
"source of product" and "representation of product quality."8 5
A "source of product" trademark serves the traditional function
of trademarks "as a strict emblem of source of the product."8 6
A "representation of product quality" trademark, on the other
hand, represents the manner in which the business is con-
ducted. The franchisor certifies by way of the trademark that
the end products are prepared, manufactured, or provided in
accordance with the franchisor's standards, specifications, or
methods,8 7 reflecting the goodwill and quality standards of the
franchisor.8 8 Therefore, apart from maintaining a certain quali-
ty standard, the value of a tradename does not depend on the
82. Id. at 46. The prices for these tied products were higher than compara-
ble competitors' prices. Id. at 47. These inflated prices clearly indicated price
discrimination by Chicken Delight in the sale of its franchises. See Baker,
supra note 1, at 1260.
83. The court properly considered the product separability issue as dis-
tinct from the issue of whether the quality of the franchisee's product could be
adequately controlled. 448 F.2d at 49.
84. Id. at 48-49. The defendant argued that the tied products were essen-
tial components of the franchise system. Therefore, they were not separate
and distinct items. Id. at 47-48. The court recognized that "new questions are
interjected" into tie-in cases by the franchise situation. In nonfranchise cases,
courts consider "the function of the aggregation" of products in determining
whether an aggregation of separate items is one product. Id. at 48. The analy-
sis of trademark function was substituted for the analysis of aggregation
function.
85. Id. at 48. See generally Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in
Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1174-78 (1963) (tracing the historical
derivation of the two essential functions of trademarks).
86. 448 F.2d at 48. A source product trademark bearing franchisor X's label
would verify that X manufactured the product. The court felt that this use "as
a strict emblem of source of the product to which it attaches has largely been
abandoned." Id.
87. The characterization of tradename franchising as an example of a rep-
resentation of product quality trademark has been subsequently interpreted as
the only type of franchise fitting this trademark function. The language of the
court, however, is that "[t]his is particularly true in the case of a franchise sys-
tem set up not to distribute the trade-marked goods ... [but] to conduct a cer-
tain business under a common trade-mark or trade name." Id. These words
arguably suggest that franchise aiTangements other than tradename franchises
fall under the product quality representation function, and perhaps even
franchises that distribute trademarked goods serve the product quality func-
tion as well. See infra note 101.
88. 448 F.2d at 49.
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source of the final product's component parts.89
The dichotomy between the final product sold and its com-
ponent products is crucial to an understanding of Chicken De-
light. The products tied by Chicken Delight-cooking utensils
and equipment, mixes, and packaging-were used to create the
final product sold under the Chicken Delight trademark; they
were component products. The Chicken Delight court ques-
tioned whether the trademark's goodwill value depended on
the component parts or their aggregate. For example, buyers
are not concerned with the origin of the flour used in a
hamburger bun. Rather, they merely expect the overall final
product to conform to the level of quality they associate with
the franchise. The Chicken Delight court stated that "[i]t is not
what is used, but how it is used and what results that have
given the system and its end product their entitlement to trade-
mark protection."90 The court also emphasized that the tied
products were "common articles to which the public does not
and has no reason to connect with the trade-mark."91 Applying
this functional analysis, the court concluded that the Chicken
Delight trademark was a "representation of quality."92 The
court found that the mixes, ingredients, and equipment were
component parts of the product to which the trademark's good-
will was insufficiently attached.9 3 Therefore, the tying and tied
products constituted separate items, and an illegal tie-in
existed.94
This distinction between trademark functions constituted
the major innovation of the Ninth Circuit in Chicken Delight.9 5
The court distinguished franchise systems that distribute
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The question whether a component part of the end product could ever
be guaranteed by a trademark appears to be an open one. If a component part
were advertised by the franchisor as being unique or integral to its products,
the result in a "tradename" franchise case might be altered.
94. 'The relevant question is not whether the items are essential to the
franchise, but whether it is essential to the franchise that the items be
purchased from Chicken Delight." Id. at 49.
95. In Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), which fol-
lowed Chicken Delight by almost a decade, the Fourth Circuit examined the
question, not specifically addressed in Chicken Delight, whether all "represen-
tation of product quality" trademark franchises necessarily require a finding of
separate products. The court disregarded the Chicken Delight test of product
separability, finding that court's emphasis on trademarks as the essence of the
franchise to be too restrictive. Id. at 309. The Principe court disagreed that
modern franchise trademarks only act as a guarantee of quality- "a modem
franchisor such as McDonald's offers its franchisees a complete method of do-
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trademarked goods (source trademarks) from those that con-
duct a certain business under a tradename (representation of
product quality). Chicken Delight thus provided an analytic
starting point, although it left unanswered many questions not
raised by its facts.9 6 Subsequent Ninth Circuit franchise tie-in
cases, while generally adopting the Chicken Delight approach
to product separability, have failed to apply the approach in a
manner that would aid in resolving these questions.
In Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 97 the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the Chicken Delight trademark function analysis 98
to a franchise agreement and found a single product. The de-
fendant, Baskin-Robbins, operated a nationwide chain of retail
ice cream franchises. Under the franchise agreement, franchis-
ees were required to purchase their ice cream from area
franchisors. 99 The franchisees contended that this requirement
constituted a per se illegal tie-in, because the sale of the Bas-
kin-Robbins franchise (the tying product) was conditioned on
the purchase of the Baskin-Robbins ice cream (the tied prod-
uct). The Ninth Circuit held that no antitrust violation had oc-
curred because the Baskin-Robbins trademark and the ice
cream sold by the franchisees were "inextricably interrelated"
in the public's mind'OO and consequently were not separate
products.
The Krehl court reached its conclusion by relating the
trademark functions identified in Chicken Delight to corre-
sponding franchise systems.10 ' The Krehl court recognized two
ing business.... Its regime pervades all facets of the business, from the de-
sign of the menu board to the amount of catsup on the hamburgers." Id. at 309.
96. For example, if several products are sold together in their finished form
as a package, Chicken Delight provides no guidance as to whether these are
component or final products. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
97. 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
98. The court did not consider the Fourth Circuit's approach to product
separability developed in Principe. The Krehl plaintiffs argued that Chicken
Delight held as a matter of law that a trademark always constitutes a separate
product from the good sold under the trademark. Id. at 1352. The court cor-
rectly responded that Chicken Delight only held that in certain circumstances a
trademark may be considered separate from the end product.
99. Id. at 1350. Defendants used a three-tiered organizational structure.
The franchisor licensed both a small number of area franchisors and numerous
retail franchisees. The area franchisors operated as middlemen, since they
manufactured the ice cream (from a secret formula supplied by franchisor) and
distributed it to the retail franchisees.
100. Id at 1354. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
101. 664 F.2d at 1353. The Krehl court stated that these two types of
franchise systems had been recognized and distinguished in Chicken Delight.
Chicken Deligh4 however, focused only on the trademark functions and not the
corresponding franchise systems. See 448 F.2d at 48-49.
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general types of franchise arrangements, the "business format"
system and the "distribution" system. A business format
franchise, or tradename system, conducts its business accord-
ing to the methods established by the franchisor, and the fran-
chisee is generally responsible for the final production or
preparation of the good.102 Because consumers do not associ-
ate the franchise trademark with the component items, the
trademark represents the general quality of only the end prod-
uct.1 03 In a distribution system, on the other hand, franchises
serve as "conduits" for the distribution of a good. 0 4 The good
is not produced at the franchise, but is produced by the
franchisor and distributed by the franchisee. In such an opera-
tion, the franchise trademark is associated with the source of
the finished, trademarked product. 05
The Krehl court found that the Baskin-Robbins franchise
system was a distribution system and not a business format op-
eration. The ice cream was a finished product distributed
through the franchise system and was identified by the Baskin-
Robbins trademark, which represented product source. The
court did not end its analysis, however, with its determination
that the ice cream, the tied product, was not a component item.
Instead, it proceeded to examine public perception of the
franchise trademark 06 and the effect of quality control.
The test applied by the Krehl court to determine if the
trademark identified product source was whether "[ti he desira-
bility of the trademark and the quality of the product it repre-
sents are so inextricably interrelated in the mind of the
consumer as to preclude any finding that the trademark is a
separate item for tie-in purposes." 0 7 It concluded that no tie-in
existed because the public always identifies the franchise
102. 664 F.2d at 1353.
103. A business format franchise corresponds to the representation of prod-
uct quality trademark function. "Under such a system, there is generally only a
remote connection between the trademark and the products the franchisees
are compelled to purchase. This is true because consumers have no reason to
associate with the trademark those component goods used either in the opera-
tion of the franchised store or in the manufacture of the end product." Id.
104. Id.
105. "[T]he trademark in a distribution franchise system often serves
merely as a representation of the end product marketed by the system." Id. at
1354.
106. The court could have concluded its analysis at this point, and ruled
that the products were inseparable, because the Chicken Delight approach im-
plicitly leads to the conclusion that if a tied product is not a component product
(in the broad sense of "component"), then the tied product is inseparable from
the franchise trademark. See supra text accompanying note 89.
107. 664 F.2d at 1354.
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trademark with the final product in a distribution system. 0 8
The tie-in doctrine had no application in this situation,
"[b] ecause the prohibition of tying arrangements is designed to
strike solely at the use of a dominant desired product to compel
the purchase of a second undesired commodity."1 09
The Krehl court also distinguished Chicken Delight by stat-
ing that the quality of Chicken Delight products could have
been maintained by "other means less intrusive upon competi-
tion."lo This language is a clear recitation of the least restric-
tive alternative approach. The Krehl court appeared to say that
the Baskin-Robbins trademark and ice cream were inseparable
because there was no other method to control quality than to
require purchases from area franchisors. It pointed to Baskin-
Robbins's secret ice cream formula as conclusive evidence that
product specifications were unworkable."' These statements
suggest that the court considered the availability of quality
control as an underlying factor in deciding the product separa-
bility issue.
Because the court did not focus on the absence of compo-
nent items, but rather included the extraneous analyses of
quality control and the public's perceptions, the Krehl ap-
proach does not neatly follow Chicken Delight. Nonetheless,
the Krehl court's decision clearly accords with Chicken Delight.
Two major factual distinctions explain the divergent results.
First, final preparation of the food items occurred at Chicken
Delight's franchises, while it did not at Baskin-Robbins's
franchises.112 The ice cream manufactured by Baskin-Robbins
108. Id. Chicken Delight had not explicitly required this conclusion. Chick-
en Delight developed the distinction between "product source" and "represen-
tation of quality" trademarks, but only dealt with the issue of whether a
"representation of quality" trademark could be separate from the products sold
under it. See 448 F.2d at 48-49.
109. 664 F.2d at 1354 (emphasis in original). The analysis behind this lan-
guage is clearly misconceived. It is the franchisee who does not desire the tied
product. In this case, the franchisee was forced to buy the ice cream (the unde-
sired good) to obtain the desired good (the franchise). The court focused on
the desirability of the tied good to the ultimate buyer, but the ultimate buyer is
not the buyer of the tie-in. The court appeared to acknowledge this distinction,
yet stated that "[tlhe antitrust laws, however, are not designed to facilitate
such a fraud upon the consumer." Id. at 1353 n.15. This policy concern is valid,
but it does not correct the court's misguided analysis concerning desired and
undesired goods. The Krehl court's focus on the ultimate buyer of a tied prod-
uct differs radically from the current conception of what a tie-in is, and how it
is analyzed.
110. Id. at 1353.
111. "Where, as here, the alleged tied product is manufactured pursuant to
secret formulae, the specification alternative is not available." Id. at 1353 n.12.
112. The tied mixes and ingredients sold by Chicken Delight constituted a
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was a final product, sold under the Baskin-Robbins trademark
at the franchise, and was not a component of the final product.
Second, the court in Chicken Delight defined a "product
source" trademark as a "strict emblem of the source of the
product."1 3 The use of the Baskin-Robbins trademark fits this
definition. The Baskin-Robbins trademark did not designate a
method of making ice cream, 114 but rather a certain brand of
ice cream. Because this trademark was a prototypical "product
source" trademark, the result reached in Krehl followed the
Chicken Delight approach and accords with a common sense
perception of what people expect when they buy Baskin-Rob-
bins ice cream.
In Hamro v. Shell Oil, 115 the Ninth Circuit relied on the
Krehl analysis extensively when it examined whether a gaso-
line trademark and the gasoline sold under that trademark at a
service station constituted separate products. The plaintiff
Hamro operated a full service filling station which he obtained
from Shell Oil Company under lease and dealer agreements."i6
Shell tied Hamrro's use of its trademark to his exclusive
purchase of Shell gasoline.11 Although Hamro, unlike the Bas-
kin-Robbins franchisees, sold products in addition to the tied
gasoline,1 1 8 the court found the gasoline inseparable from the
franchise trademark and rejected Hamro's antitrust claim.
The Hamro court recited the two categories of trademarks
from Chicken Delight, relied on Krehl to distinguish a source
trademark from a representation of quality trademark, and
then applied virtually verbatim the Krehl reasoning that a
source trademark cannot constitute a separate product. It dis-
tinguished business format franchises from distribution
"multitude of separate articles" that produced one end product. 448 F.2d at 49.
Component parts were deemed separate from the end product. The opposite
occurred at Baskin-Robbins franchises, however. The ice cream was delivered
in its final form to the franchise, where it was scooped out of the container and
put on a cone.
113. 448 F.2d at 48.
114. A contrary argument might be raised, however. For example, major
soft drink trademarks definitely stand for a particular product, and would ap-
pear to fit the source product function. These firms, however, manufacture
only the syrup and allow independent bottlers to complete the soft drink. One
might attempt to analogize the role of Baskin-Robbins ice cream in its cones or
sundaes with that of the syrup in the creation of soft drinks. The problem is
how to define trademark functions in these more ambiguous cases.
115. 674 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982).
116. Id. at 786.
117. Id.
118. Hamro sold petroleum products, tires, batteries, automotive accesso-
ries, and mechanical service. Id.
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franchises by stating that a business format franchisee "does
not pass on a finished branded product, but actually prepares
the product."" 9 Because the court viewed the individual
franchises to be "conduits" for the distribution of Shell gaso-
line,120 Hamro's franchise did not meet the business format def-
inition. The court then applied the Krehl criterion that one
product exists if that product and the trademark are "inextrica-
bly interrelated" in the mind of the public, and determined that
Shell gasoline and the Shell trademark were so interrelated as
to constitute one product:12' 'the nexus between the trade-
mark and the tied product, Shell gasoline, is sufficiently close
to warrant treating them as one product."122 This language
constituted the court's sole explanation for classifying the Shell
trademark as a source of product trademark. The decision did
not analyze Shell's ability to control the quality of the gasoline
through less restrictive means of quality control.
B. PROBLEMS wrI THE NINTH Cmcurr's CURRENT APPROACH
The results in Chicken Delight, Krehl, and Hamro appear to
be consistent if one focuses on the distinction between final
and component products. Unfortunately, these cases do not
present an unambiguous analytic approach to franchise prod-
uct separability, because the courts have considered several
119. Id. at 787.
120. Id. at 788.
121. Hamro also argued that the lease of his station from Shell was tied to
the purchase of Shell gasoline. The court ruled that no tie existed because
"Hamro would not have violated his lease if he had bought non-Shell gasoline
and marketed it under his own name." Id. at 787.
122. Id. at 788. The court relied on Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th
Cir. 1975), as a second basis for its decision. The Tenth Circuit had found one
product in "a factual context almost identical to the one" in Hamro. 674 F.2d at
788. Plaintiff Redd was a 'Jobber" who marketed gasoline as "Abajo Petro-
leum." A 'jobber" resells petroleum products wholesale from major oil compa-
nies such as Shell to service stations. Shel required its "jobbers" to sell only
Shell products under the Shell trademark. Redd argued that this requirement
constituted an illegal tie-in, but the court rejected his claim.
The Hamro court's reliance on Redd is unfounded. The factual situation in
Redd differs in several significant respects. First, Redd did business under the
name "Abajo Petroleum," and thus did not fall under the goodwill of the Shell
trademark in the service aspects of the franchise. Second, Redd did not oper-
ate a retail service station, but rather was a wholesale jobber. Unlike a service
station operator, a jobber does not gain the benefits of Shell's marketing prac-
tices. Finally, the Redd court stated that because Redd had his business enter-
prise identified under his own name, "he did not have a franchise as the term
has come to be used." 524 F.2d at 1056. Consequently, none of the special
problems of franchise tie-ins applied to Redd. See Note, supra note 12, at 974
(distinguishing Redd from Chicken Delight because of the absence of an enter-
prise franchise agreement in Redd).
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factors in addition to the final product and component product
dichotomy and have used vague, imprecise language and stan-
dards. This line of cases reveals three major analytical
problems with the Ninth Circuit's current approach: (1) it is
unclear whether a court should consider a franchisor's ability
to control product quality without the tie-in in determining
product separability; (2) the guidelines to be used in deciding
whether a franchise trademark represents the source of the
product or product quality are ambiguous; and (3) insufficient
attention is given to providing a framework for distinguishing
component products from final products.
The Krehl court created a major analytic problem when it
applied a business justification analysis to the product separa-
bility question by considering the efficacy of controlling prod-
uct quality without the tie-in. In undertaking this analysis of
quality control, the Krehl court deviated from the Chicken De-
light emphasis on component and finished products; Chicken
Delight did not even consider quality control to be an aspect of
product separability. This mixture of standards in Krehl per-
petuates the confusion originated in Jerrold123 and fails to ex-
plain what is the decisive factor in determining product
separability. The decision did not clarify whether the type of
franchise or the ability to control product quality is determina-
tive of product separability, nor did it make clear the extent to
which franchise trademark function and the ability to control
quality are interrelated, if at all. Would the Baskin-Robbins
trademark still constitute a source of product trademark if it
were possible for the franchisor to maintain adequate control
over the quality of the ice cream by using specifications? 24
This is unclear following Krehl.
The Hamro court did not undertake a quality control analy-
sis to determine whether quality specifications would be un-
workable for gasoline. Application of quality control analysis to
the product separability issue in Hamro, however, could poten-
123. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960); see supra notes 58-69 and accompany-
ing text.
124. Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,089 (ED.
N.Y. 1979), addressed this question in a context similar to Krehl. The defend-
ant franchisor marketed "Mister Softee" ice cream through individual franchis-
ees using a "Mister Softee" truck in which the ice cream is manufactured. The
defendant required franchisees to purchase all ice cream ingredients and sup-
plies from Mister Softee, Inc. The court found separate products, and focused
on quality control as an affirmative defense. The court concluded that ice
cream quality could be controlled by specification. The court distinguished Es-
posito from Carve4 and thus from Kreh4 by noting the absence of a secret
formula for "Mister Softee" ice cream. Id.
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tially have changed the court's decision, because quality speci-
fications are arguably viable in that context. 125  If the Krehl
discussion of quality control indicates that this factor is signifi-
cant in determining product separability, then arguably a gaso-
line trademark should be regarded as only warranting the
quality of the gasoline rather than its source, because gasoline
of the same octane level is fungible.126 If gasoline is indeed
fungible, the octane specifications should be sufficient to en-
sure and control gasoline quality.
The absence of any discussion of quality control in Hamro,
which was decided after Krehl, suggests, however, that the
Ninth Circuit does not consider the ability of the franchisor to
control quality of the tied product without the tie-in to be a crit-
ical factor in product separability. The Krehl court's desire to
distinguish Chicken Delight provides a possible explanation for
the quality control language. Nevertheless, the discussion of
quality control in Krehl is confusing and detracts from the de-
velopment of a unified treatment of product separability in the
franchise tie-in context.
Another troubling aspect of Krehl and Hamro is the court's
extensive reliance on the public's perceptions of a trademark
as a means of judging the trademark's function. The Krehl
court stated that products are inseparable if they are "inextri-
cably interrelated in the mind of the consumer."12 7 This raises
the problem of how a court is to ascertain whether the trade-
mark and the product are "inextricably interrelated" in the
125. According to the Third Circuit, whether a particular gasoline dealer-
ship constitutes a Chicken Delight type of franchise is a question of fact. Bogo-
sian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978). In Bogosian, the plaintiff was a service station owner operating
under the same type of tying arrangement as found in Hamro. Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,309, at 75,611 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
126. A product is fungible if it is interchangeable with another product.
Gasoline would thus be fungible if no inherent difference in quality levels ex-
isted between brands. The issue of whether gasoline is fungible has twice sur-
vived summary judgment attacks in Bogosian. See 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at
75,612-13. In Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 75,390 (D. Utah
1974), rev'd 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976), it ap-
pears that a major oil company did not dispute the fungibility argument. Shell
explicitly stated in response to Interrogatory 5 that there is no difference in
"Shell gasoline and other gasoline delivered to plaintiff or third persons." It
should be noted that Shell purchased gasoline for resale under the Shell marks
pursuant to exchange agreements and by specifications. 1974-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) at 98,267-68. The substantial exchange of gasoline among the major oil
companies supports this fungibility argument, and the Utah District Court con-
cluded that "petroleum products can be purchased by specification." Id. at
98,268.
127. 664 F.2d at 1354.
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public's mind. 28 Should the court make a subjective evalua-
tion, or should it examine objective evidence, such as consumer
polls? The public perception standard was intuitively clear in
Baskin-Robbins, given that people expect to buy ice cream
manufactured by Baskin-Robbins at a Baskin-Robbins store.
But multiple product situations like Hamro illustrate that intui-
tive clarity often fails in more complex situations. Hamro ruled
that Shell gas and the Shell trademark are "inextricably inter-
related," but it too failed to elaborate the standards it used to
evaluate the public's perceptions. The public might perceive
gasoline to be fungible, which would support characterizing the
Shell trademark as a representation of product quality. Unfor-
tunately, neither decision instructs future courts on how to de-
termine the public's perception in this matter.
The third set of problems stemming from the Krehl and
Hamro decisions is their emphasis on the overall franchise op-
eration's relationship to the franchise trademark rather than
the relationship between the tied product and the trademark,
and their failure to develop a framework for distinguishing
component products from final products. Both decisions at
least partially rested on the distinction between franchises us-
ing component parts to produce an end product and franchises
simply selling a finished product. It is unclear from the lan-
guage used, however, whether this finished good dichotomy is
intended to be determinative in all cases. Chicken Delight did
not directly answer this question, 29 nor did it indicate how to
analyze tied products sold in multiple product contexts. In a
case in which the franchisee markets several finished goods,
the franchise trademark might have some function in addition
to identifying the source of the product.130 If the franchisee
markets both finished and unfinished goods, Krehl does not in-
dicate what approach should be taken.
128. This type of public judgment should be distinguished from the "pub-
lic's perception" of the level of quality it associates with a trademark. To con-
clude that a trademark and a product are "inextricably interrelated" in the
public's mind, the court must merely determine that the particular product
generates the goodwill represented by the trademark; it need not evaluate the
extent of the goodwill.
129. See supra note 93. Similarly, the district court in Krehl left open the
question whether every product source trademark and the underlying product
are inseparable. "This Court does not conclude as a matter of law that a trade-
mark used to designate product origin and the underlying product must always
be a single product for purpose of tie-in claims." Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice
Cream Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 62,806, at 78,706 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
130. For example, the trademark might represent the quality of the package
of goods, the components of which are the several finished goods.
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Krehl increased confusion over analyzing tie-ins in which
multiple products are sold because of its deviation from the
Chicken Delight "essential function" test. Chicken Delight fo-
cused on the function of the franchise trademark in relation to
the tied product, while Krehl aligned franchise trademarks
with either the business format or the product distribution
franchise model.' 3' The Krehl approach is problematic, how-
ever, because final products may be distributed and component
products prepared at the same franchise. Consequently, the
trademark function (representation of product quality or indi-
cation of product source) corresponding to the franchise model
the court selects (business format or product distribution),
may not accurately reflect the trademark's function with re-
spect to the specific tied product. By focusing on the franchise
model in which the tied product is sold, rather than on the tied
product, the Krehl court moved even further away from the
critical task of distinguishing final from component products.
The facts of Hamro present a situation in which deciding
whether a particular item is a final or a component product be-
comes especially difficult. Unlike Baskin-Robbins, which sells
only one product through its franchises, Shell markets multiple
products. Shell dealers sell tires, oil, and automobile parts and
service in addition to gasoline. The Shell trademark, therefore,
may indicate both the source of certain products and the quali-
ty of the general car service the franchisee provides.132 Argua-
bly, gasoline might be associated with either of these
trademark functions. For example, because Shell stations pro-
vide service for all aspects of the automobile and market the
idea that their stations provide quality beyond the octane level
of their gasoline,133 one could view the sale of gasoline as but
one component of that service, with the Shell trademark repre-
senting the quality of all products and services the station pro-
vides.134 Still, the better result would be to view gasoline as a
final product, as the Ninth Circuit did in Hamro. The gasoline
131. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
132. The mechanical service provided by Hamro is one clear example of a
quality representation item sold by the franchisee.
133. Major oil companies spend a great deal of their marketing budgets in
an effort to create an image of prompt, friendly, and reliable service at their sta-
tions. If gasoline is indeed fungible, and of a uniform quality, and the major oil
companies all price at a somewhat uniform level, then they are forced to differ-
entiate their lines of products in some other way. Selling service is one way to
differentiate.
134. An additional problem in characterizing the trademark's function as
identifying product source arises when the franchisor does not manufacture
the product. For example, if Shell obtains gasoline refined by other oil compa-
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is sold separately and the Shell franchise arrangement is
designed primarily to distribute one product, namely, gasoline.
Hamro suggests, however, that cases will arise in which it
will be extremely difficult to distinguish a final from a compo-
nent product. Neither of the Ninth Circuit's other decisions,
Chicken Delight or Krehl, is helpful in developing a framework
to *resolve the difficult cases, because each represents an ex-
treme. In Chicken Delight, the tied products were ingredients
used at the franchise to prepare the final product; they were
unambiguously component parts. Just as clearly, the tied prod-
uct in Krehl, ice cream, was sold as the final product at
franchises.
The more difficult case arises when a product is delivered
to the franchisee in its finished form, but is sold as an accompa-
niment to the dominant product of the franchise. An example
of this situation would be a special sauce (condiment) sold at a
roast beef sandwich franchise. The primary product sold is the
sandwich. It is prepared at the franchise in a "business for-
mat" operation similar to that in Chicken Delight, and the
franchise trademark consequently would be characterized as a
"representation of quality." The sauce is different from the
component products tied in Chicken Delight, however, because
the franchisee could not sell those products (mixes, paper
products) independently; they were necessarily component
products. The sauce, on the other hand, bears the name of the
franchisor and can be bought separately for home use. Al-
though the franchisee obtains the sauce as a finished product,
the sauce's predominant function is to enhance the roast beef
sandwich-it is available without cost to customers at the res-
taurant site just as ketchup is provided with french fries. The
use and function of this finished product, therefore, is very dif-
ferent from that of ice cream at a Baskin-Robbins franchise.
This scenario illustrates the problem of using current Ninth
Circuit approaches to product separability when the tied prod-
uct appears to be a finished product and is sold in a business
format franchise. Whether there is a product separability ques-
tion turns on how one characterizes what the franchise sells
and on which product the court focuses. Because the Ninth
Circuit cases have not yet considered the multiple product con-
text, they do not suggest a coherent framework for resolving
product separability in a more difficult case. The alternative
nies, then it is more difficult to see how the trademark's function can be to
identify product source, because Shell has not produced the product.
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approach of the Fourth Circuit in Principe v. McDonald's
Corp. 135 provides no solution to the problem either. The inte-
gral component analysis employed in Principe can be manipu-
lated to include almost any product used in a franchise
business. Such a broad test does not adequately protect the
courts' underlying concern for the promotion of free economic
choice in the marketplace. Rather, a reformulation of the Ninth
Circuit's basic approach that eliminates some of the vague and
immaterial language found in the case law, and deals specifi-
cally with distinguishing component from final products, will
facilitate a more reasoned application of the Ninth Circuit's
franchise product separability test.
III. A REFORMULATION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
APPROACH TO PRODUCT SEPARABILITY
The underlying criterion used by the Ninth Circuit for de-
termining whether two separate products exist in franchise tie-
in litigation is the dichotomy between component and final
products. When the tied products considered by the court were
sold as final products, the court held that the trademarks and
the products were inseparable. On the other hand, when the
tied product was only a component of the product sold by the
franchisee, as in Chicken Delight, the court found the trade-
mark did not signify product source, and thus was separable.
Discussions in Krehl of a franchisor's ability to control quality
and of the public's perception of a trademark's function as as-
pects of product separability, however, detract from a clear un-
derstanding of the Ninth Circuit's approach to franchise
product separability. The following reformulation eliminates
these confusing aspects and presents a clearer framework with
which to distinguish final from component products in the few
instances in which this distinction is not readily apparent.
The product separability test in the franchise context can
be reformulated simply by characterizing the tied product as
either a final product distributed through the franchise system
or a component of the dominant end product sold by the fran-
chisee. This test makes explicit the implicit primary criterion
employed by the Ninth Circuit. This test does not consider the
public's perception of the trademark function or any quality
control analysis in determining product separability. Quality
control analysis is confined to its traditional role as an affirma-
tive business justification defense.
135. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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If the tied product is delivered to the franchise in its
finished form, and is not sold in conjunction with other prod-
ucts, the tied product will be found to be a final product and
thus inseparable from the trademark. Conversely, if the tied
product is combined with other items to produce the end prod-
uct sold under the franchise trademark, and in so doing the
tied product is altered, it will be held to be a component prod-
uct separable from the franchise trademark. This simple analy-
sis will resolve the vast majority of cases.
More difficulty arises in making the distinction between
component and final products when the tied good is a finished
product but sold in a multiple product context.13 6 In this situa-
tion, the court must determine if the tied, finished product ac-
tually constitutes a component of a package of goods that are
sold by the franchise as one multifaceted, integrated product or
service.137 To make this determination, the court should con-
sider six factors: (1) whether the multiple products are nor-
mally sold together;13 8  (2) whether they are used
interdependently and for the same or similar purposes;13 9
(3) whether the products are used as materials for service or
repair provided by the franchisee;140 (4) whether the franchisor
establishes detailed standards and regulations for the manner
in which the package products sold are utilized;141 (5) whether
136. A multiple product context should be defined as a franchise that sells
finished products, or a mixture of finished and component products, as a
package.
137. Automobile servicing arguably is an example of a multifaceted, inte-
grated product. A clearer example is a tradename wax applied in a car wash
franchise. The central criterion with which to make the integrated product de-
termination is whether the final product sold is significantly different from, en-
hanced by, or improved over the tied product (i.e., whether the character of the
tied product has been sufficiently changed to justify calling it a component of
some other product).
138. Selling products together as a package indicates that they are designed
for a common purpose and that the products are components of one integrated
product.
139. If products are used together to achieve the same purpose or result,
then they can be characterized as components of one product aimed at a partic-
ular result. This use of products is very similar to the use of component prod-
ucts in Chicken Delight.
140. The use of the tied product in service or repair work performed by the
franchisee supports the inference that the tied product is not the end product
bought by the consumer. A customer is paying to have his car fixed, not neces-
sarily to have a particular brand of valve put in.
141. Standards or directions constitute the additional ingredient that might
transform what ordinarily would be just a bundle of goods into one integrated
product. If special, expert uses are made of the tied product, then the whole
package would exceed the sum of its parts. Something more than the finished
good is being sold by the franchisee.
'"The business format franchise involves the exploitation not merely of
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the tied product is manufactured by someone other than the
franchisor;142 and (6) whether the tied product is sold together
with a more dominant product that is produced at the
franchise. Consideration of these factors would aid in deciding
the extent to which the tied product acts as a complement to
the other products or whether it functions independently. The
greater the number of factors present, with emphasis on factors
two and six, the more evidence there is that the tied product is
a component of the end product marketed by the franchisor.
This reformulation provides a useful predictive tool. Par-
ties will be better able to assess the merits of their claims, and
more intelligent negotiating and decreased wasteful litigation
will result. The test's easy application and predictive value is
apparent when one applies it to determine product separability
in Chicken Delight, Krehl, and Hamro. The Chicken Delight
tied products, for example, are clearly component products.
They are used at the franchise to produce and package the final
product--chicken. Consequently, they constitute products sep-
arate from the trademark. The Baskin-Robbins ice cream in
Krehl, on the other hand, is a final product, because it is a
finished product in a nonmultiple product context when deliv-
ered to the franchise. This determination would end the court's
analysis. The tied product would be held inseparable from the
trademark without the needless and confusing consideration of
whether the tied product and the trademark are "inextricably
interrelated" in the public's mind. Finally, because multiple
products were sold at the service station franchise in Hamro, a
court would consider the six factors described earlier to deter-
mine whether gasoline constitutes a final or component product
of the franchise. Because gasoline is sold by itself and is the
dominant product sold by the franchisee, a court would classify
it as a final product, and the gasoline and the trademark would
not constitute separate products.
The test is especially useful in approaching the hypotheti-
cal case of sauce sold at a roast beef sandwich franchise. This
goods identified by a trade mark or an invention, but the preparation of the
blueprint of a successful way of carrying on a business in all its aspects. The
blueprint must have been so carefully prepared as to minimize the risks inher-
ent in opening any new business." M. MENDELSOHN, THE GUmE To FRANcHIs-
ING 4 (3d ed. 1982).
142. A franchisee's claim that its trademark represents product source is
much weaker, by definition, if the franchisor did not actually manufacture the
tied product. For example, Chicken Delight did not manufacture the tied items,
while Baskin-Robbins, through its area franchisors, did. In Hamro, it is unclear
whether Shell actually refined the gasoline.
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case is an example of a product delivered in a finished form to
the franchisee that likely would be found to constitute a com-
ponent product after a consideration of the factors listed in the
reformulation. Although it may be sold separately, the sauce's
primary use in the franchise scheme is as a complement to the
primary product of the franchise-the roast beef sandwich.
Factor one is satisfied because the sauce is sold, or in this case
provided, primarily with the sandwich. Since the sauce and
sandwich are used interdependently, factor two also exists, and
factor six is present because the roast beef sandwich is clearly
the more dominant of the two products. Factor four might also
exist, because it is quite probable that a franchisor would es-
tablish standards for the use of the sauce.14 3 The existence of
these factors indicates that the sauce is primarily used in con-
junction with the sandwich, to enhance and improve it. Thus,
its primary function is as a component of the primary product
of the franchise, which makes it separate from the trademark.
Contrasting the Fourth Circuit's approach in Principe v.
McDonald's Corp. 144 with this reformulation demonstrates the
need for one further refinement in any consideration of
franchise tie-in sales. The revised Ninth Circuit approach is
vastly superior to that of the Fourth Circuit because it does not
contain the elastic quality of the Principe "integral compo-
nents" test. Yet the legitimate desire of the Principe court to
promote franchising of business is not fully met by an ap-
proach to franchise tie-ins that allows a franchisor to use the
tie-in to ensure control of the tied product's quality only if the
tie-in is the alternative least restrictive to competition. A quali-
ty control defense currently will fail if any alternative, though
costly to the franchisor, is adequate to ensure product quali-
ty.1 45 The Ninth Circuit should relax this business justification
requirement for franchise tie-ins, which would not be inconsis-
tent with the philosophy of quality control expressed in Krehl.
If some mechanism, such as specification of quality standards,
can ensure product quality without a cost to the franchisor that
is unreasonable in the judgment of the court, then the tie-in of
a component product should be illegal. A court should not re-
quire, however, that the tie-in be the alternative least restric-
tive to competition, but should rather apply its own judgment
as to reasonable costs, keeping in mind the policy goals of pre-
143. See Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 1980) (Mc-
Donald's specifies the amount of ketchup on the hamburgers).
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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serving freedom of economic choice without discouraging the
franchise mode of business.146  The legitimate needs of
franchisors will be better met, and courts will not be forced to
manipulate product separability findings to protect the
franchisor's needs.147
IV. CONCLUSION
Prevailing approaches to product separability in franchise
tie-in sales have become unpredictable and confusing. An ini-
tial solution lies in reformulating the approach suggested by
the Ninth Circuit in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. The refor-
mulation proposed in this Note concentrates solely on deter-
mining whether the alleged tied product is a component or a
final product. It develops an analytic framework that produces
results consistent with recent Ninth Circuit cases while facili-
tating the resolution of more difficult cases.
146. The court should specifically consider the cost to the franchisor of en-
forcing and policing the specifications. The past use of specifications in the in-
dustry, the cost and policy problems of these specifications, and whether
efficiencies exist for production of the tied product by the franchisor should
also be evaluated.
147. 'The 'two products' characterization may be the only way for the lower
courts to avoid per se condemnation of practices that they regard as innocuous
or even beneficial." Baker, supra note 1, at 1313.
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